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PHOENIX-EMPIRE: TWO FACES OF POST-SOVIET EAGLE
(IMPERIAL-NATIONAL DUALISM)

What is post-Soviet Russia? An empire, or a national state, or a specific Eurasian dualism – imperial-Russian? Should ‘imperial’ and ‘national’ on Russian soil be opposed or could they be combined and complemented as ‘Rossiyan’ with ‘Russian’?

This issue has been disputable throughout the last quarter of the existence of new Russia and was one of the reasons, which made me study the post-Soviet Russian period in terms of power-national identity relations. In Russia, regardless of the historical period, it is namely the incumbents that are responsible for everything happening in the state and that hypertrophy is natural for the huge Russian areas.

The other Russian sign of power is the sacralization of the state and its identification - to a certain extent – with the King, the Emperor, the Secretary General or the President of Russia. The personal factor and the irrational attitude towards the state (between the two extremes – worship and demonization) form a part of the Russian identity and of its capability to mobilize its resources in time of severe historical trials.

Our modern history allows the historian to be simultaneously a participant, a source and an observer, like Tukididis, as far as possible. It is true that the distance of time gives advantage to the purely academic historians that are not related to their heroes, like the people having dared to write modern history. I think, however, that historical knowledge can throw a light on the analysis of modern times, because however diverse the set of instruments of the representatives of different humanitarian sciences – social analysts, political scientists, anthropologists, philosophers, etc. - for the study of the contemporary environment could be, only the historian is capable to ‘see’ tendencies, which he has detected in past centuries. This is so, because there is a relation to the past. The fact that we do not perceive it does not make it non-existent but makes us attractively infantile having a different dioptré for short-sightedness. Yet, it also makes us vulnerable.

When I immersed into the Eurasian topic of the historiosophical heritage of the early Eurasians¹ within the post-Bolshevik emigration, I found an explanation for the archetype of ‘Russian national identity’, namely, ‘phoenix-nation’, i.e. the Russian national education process will always be open, unfinished, integrating through the Russian culture, being European, and preserving the ethnic sovereignty

¹ Григорова, Д. Евразийството в Русия. София, 2008.

of each people within Russia. It is a 'phoenix' because it is capable of recovering after historical cataclysms (1812, 1917, 1941–1945, 1991...) without elapsing into the track of European nationalism. Similarly to the Soviet-time Russian rail tracks that are broader than the European ones (a matter of national security), the ethno-national (completed) type of identity within Russian territory is incompatible with the Russian areas. It is possible to develop only within limited territories and leads to disintegration.

It is not a mere chance that Zbigniew Brzezinski maintains the theory of opposing the 'imperial' to the 'national' in Russian context in relation to post-Soviet Russia as a former empire, which should become a national state. Brzezinski goes as far as defining the Russian aristocracy of the imperial period as Baltic, German, Polish and Georgian elite ('That was elite!'), which 'had never become authentically Russian regardless of the Russian piety [he refers to the Eastern Orthodox religion] and self-identification'. In his opinion, the absence of a Russian elite persists within USSR. Under the Bolsheviks, it were 'foreigners that were in power' although there were few Russians among them and Lenin was succeeded by a Georgian².

If Stalin was only Georgian, former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili would not demolish his monument in the centre of Gori after the Colour Revolution of Roses. It is namely Stalin's policy that was anti-Lenin and pro-Russian (in national rather than in ethnic terms) for revival of the Russian idea from the second half of the 1930s to the end of the war³. Brzezinski provides an interpretation in the spirit of ethnocentric nationalism, which could speculatively be applied to a high number of countries with marginal nationalities, including USA (it is as if someone would challenge the American-Polish dualism of Brzezinski himself). The curious thing in this case is the tendency that is imposed and not its academic precision.

Post-Soviet Russia is indeed faced with the task of solving the crisis of the national identity and emerging from the debate of 'saving the empire or construction of a national state'⁴ as of the beginning of the 1990s.

² *Russia is going to a very difficult process of recovering its own national identity. Russia for a long time has an Empire but elite was mostly from the Baltic states and the Germany... from Poland, Georgia – that was elite! not authentically Russian even though Russia's religiously and in terms of identity.* Zbigniew Brzezinski on Russia and Ukraine, Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, December 19, 2014. <http://csis.org/multimedia/zbigniew-brzezinski-russia-and-ukraine>

³ Вдовин, А.И., Зорин В.Ю., Никонов, А.В. Русский народ в национальной политике XX век. М., 1998, 211–278.

⁴ *A policy of 'empire saving' versus one of 'nation-building':* Dunlop, John B. *Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*. Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 287; *Russia's future as a liberal democratic country precludes her transformation into a Russian national state:* Anatoly M. Khazanov. *Ethnic Nationalism in the Russian Federation*. *Daedalus*, Vol. 126, 3 (Summer, 1997), p. 139.

This was prompted by the disappearance of the ‘Soviet’ one in 1991. Actually, I am not sure of the ‘disappearance’ of the Soviet identity – not from the point of view of the live psychology of the so-called ‘sovki’ but because of the most important characteristic feature of the Soviet nation as a winner-nation after 9 May 1945. Until then, there were only Soviet citizens but not a national community.

The navel string between new Russia and USSR is not the geopolitical space including over 20 million Russians but the Victory Day, which so far has been the only holiday uniting all layers of the Russian society regardless of their political or other differences. It is namely for this reason that Russia’s geopolitical opponents propose a ‘mild’ version of depreciation of 9 May with the theory about identity between Nazism and Stalinism being imposed on a large scale (the ones that are still confined to the thinking of the Cold War period would also add Putinism).

The idea about the European Parliament decision as of 23 September 2008 to proclaim 23 August an European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism came from the Baltic countries and Poland (the latter quite forgetting the fact that after the 1938 Munich Conference, with the approval of the European Great Powers, Hungary, along with Germany invaded Czechoslovakia. Likewise, Russia ‘does not remember’ 17 September 1939, as well as the fact that the war became Great Patriotic for USSR only after 22 June 1941). ‘The fight for people’s hearts’ and, sometimes, their minds is an invariable part of human history.

The effect of such comparisons is at first glance like the wrapping of public buildings by artist Christo: the thin cloth covers the stone building and, although it does not destroy it, it makes it invisible. You should remember it so as to wish to remove the curtain, whether word, pictorial or digital.

Periodization of post-Soviet Russia

The author’s periodization, offered in this book, is from 8 December 1991 to 16 March 2014. The starting point of post-Soviet Russia, which I have accepted is eloquent – the Belovezha Accords, whereby Russia, Ukraine and Belarus denounced the agreement on the establishment of USSR (it is quite another issue whether the three republics had a legitimate power to determine the fate of the federation but the fact is irreversible).

In order to determine an end date, if it is not just a jubilee aspiration towards convenience – a habit of history writers, who handle linear sections of time easier than multidimensional outlines – it should be related to a factor influencing both the domestic and the foreign policy of Russia, on the one hand, and, on the other, having strong historical momentum during the following periods (historical in the meaning of presence – if it is not depicted by history, it does not exist).

In my opinion, the most meaningful end point for post-Soviet Russia is the polite accession⁵ of Crimea on 16 March 2014 because it is not just a symbolic act of actual restoration of the position of a Great Power, lost by Russia in 1991, but an event with a strong resonance in the Russian society in its post-Soviet history. Crimea will be a starting point not only of the end of the post-Soviet area but will also set the beginning of the Eurasian one because it coincides with the integration processes having resulted in the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in January 2015 (later joined by Armenia, likely to be followed by Kyrgyzstan).

In his annual report before the Duma in April 2012, Vladimir Putin said that the end of the post-Soviet period has come⁶ (1991–2012). It was rather an end of his premiership and smooth transition to the presidency. However, does the ‘Putin era’, as they call Russia as of 1999, coincide with the post-Soviet era? I would not agree because Putin is a successor and a select of Yeltsin, who set the beginning of the presidential post-Soviet Russian republic in a Soviet style – by shooting at Parliament (1993).

While the process of Eurasian economic integration began in 2000, the geopolitical change in the Russian orbit - from a country ‘defeated in the Cold War’⁷ to a Great (although regional) Power - was formally announced by Putin in his Munich speech in 2007. It was not a mere chance that the first direct confrontation between Russia and USA occurred in the next year – during the August war of 2008 (it would be more precise to call it ‘Georgian-Ossetin-Russian’ war and not just ‘Georgian-Russia’ as there were three parties involved).

The second external test for geopolitical turbulence emerged in Russia after Putin’s decision to run for a third term as President in 2012. It occurred again in the following year but this time at the most sensitive place on the Federation’s border, in Ukraine – the Majdan in 2013–2014. Two integration projects clashed on Ukrainian land: the Eurasian one (regional, of Russia) and the trans-Atlantic one (global, of USA). It is to determine the situation in the next century and is a fight

⁵ I have chosen namely the term of ‘polite accession’ because the international law treats it in the same way as the ‘right to self-identification’ (exercised in the referendum of March 2014, which, albeit disputed due to the lack of a sufficient number of international observers, showed the happiness of the return of the Russians – an undoubted majority of the Crimean population - to their homeland. The term ‘annexation’ is also correct, if referred to ‘the right of sovereignty of the state borders’ but it cannot actually change anything and remains a matter of a legal and geopolitical position. The Unification of the Kingdom of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia was also an ‘annexation’ from a Turkish perspective.

⁶ Владимир Путин. Постсоветский период в жизни России завершён, впереди новый этап развития страны. – ИТАР—ТАСС, 11 апреля 2012 г. <http://itar-tass.com/arhiv/542941>

⁷ “Распад СССР и крах советской модели был воспринят Западом как свидетельство его безоговорочной правоты - моральной, исторической, экономической”: Федор Лукьянов. Европа, которую мы потеряли. – Российская газета, 05.11.2014. Федеральный выпуск № 6523 (251). <http://www.rg.ru/2014/11/05/lukjanov.html>

for the Old Continent, faced with a choice between a Trans-Atlantic agreement with USA and a 'Big Europe', from Vladivostok to Lisbon, with Russia.

While Russia's Eurasian project is regional (the European Union plus the newly-established Eurasian Economic Union on the principle of multipolarity, in partnership with BRICS, etc.), the Trans-Atlantic project is global (USA plus EU, plus Eurasia, after the fragmentation of Russia, being the wealthiest region in terms of resources and closest to Asia, with faster economic growth than Europe, on the principle of corporate monopolarity). China will stay with the winner in order to outlive it.

The accession of Crimea (March 2014) is a historical fact, which not only separates post-Soviet from Eurasian Russia but also marks the end of the 'long 20th century' and the beginning of the 21st one, when the integration projects will dominate over the national one.

Geopolitical-Eurasian identity of post-Soviet Russia: Big Europe or Big Eurasia?

In his brochure *The New World Order* (1940), Herbert Wells says that before 1914 his generation imagined that the Franco-German War (1870-1871) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) were the 'final conflicts between Great Powers' and that a 'balance of power' had been established⁸. In 1940, at the beginning of WWII, Wells called it 'the Chamberlain-Hitler war'⁹, and the League of Nations, which failed to prevent the conflict, 'the opiate of liberal thought in the world'.

How did the English fiction writer see the world order: as 'practical unification', 'the end of the period of the sovereign states', 'an age of transition' and a 'fundamental need of revolutionary reconstruction'¹⁰. For Wells, the concept of 'revolution; is not so much romantically idealized but rather perceived as an inevitable change for a 'profound social revolution, profounder event than the

⁸ H.G. Wells. *The New World Order*, 1940.

"I think that in the decades before 1914 not only I but most of my generation—in the British Empire, America, France and indeed throughout most of the civilised world—thought that war was dying out.

So it seemed to us. It was an agreeable and therefore a readily acceptable idea. We imagined the Franco-German War of 1870-71 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 were the final conflicts between Great Powers, that now there was a Balance of Power sufficiently stable to make further major warfare impracticable".

⁹ H.G. Wells. *The New World Order*, 1940.

"The war; the Chamberlain-Hitler War, is being waged so far by the British Empire in quite the old spirit. It has learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. There is the same resolute disregard of any more fundamental problem. [...] For all that period the League of Nations has been the opiate of liberal thought in the world".

¹⁰ H.G. Wells. *The New World Order*, 1940.

"...we are living in the end of a definite period of history, the period of the sovereign states. As we used to say in the eighties with ever-increasing truth: "We are in an age of transition"; "The war is incidental; the need for revolutionary reconstruction is fundamental".

revolution attempted by the Communists in Russia' (for him, the latter has failed due to 'impatience, violence [...] intellectual insufficiency'); 'The cosmopolitan revolution to a world collectivism, which is the only alternative to chaos' with a declaration for human rights¹¹.

For Herbert Wells, however, 'collectivism' is synonymous with 'globalism' This is an English-styled globalism. New redistribution of the wealth of the Earth transpire behind the beautiful outlines of a new world order protecting the human rights. This is the consecutive re-colonization that we now witness in the epoch of 'globalism'. In his book *Russia in the Shadows*, H.G. Wells shares his personal impressions from the Bolshevik revolution. He points out the reason for the West's disappointment from the October 1917 events: 'The collapse of the civilized system in Russia into peasant barbarianism means that Europe will be cut off for many years from the mineral wealth of Russia, and from any supply of raw products from this area, from its corn, flax, and the like. It is an open question whether the Western Powers can get along without these supplies. Their cessation certainly means a general impoverishment of Western Europe.'¹².

The colonial attitude of the West to the East (Russia-Eurasia) did not change even after the cold phase of the Cold War (I use the term 'phase' because, after 1991, the Cold War did not end but was transformed as geopolitical confrontation and competition, which is inevitable in the history of international relations and can be divided into phases but not finalized). The Eurasian project of post-Soviet Russia is a reaction to this reserved stereotype of colonial interest to the East. It is a response to the English (American)-styled globalization, on the one hand, and, on the other, it is a specific Eurasian version (EEU) of the European-styled globalization (EU).

The perception of EEU (Eurasian Economic Union) as a neo-Soviet project is a fruit of the 'Russian complex' of the West (Russia is huge, mysterious and unpredictable), on the one hand, and, on the other, a matter of competition – economic and geopolitical – for the resources of the wealthiest region of Eurasia. Herbert Wells defines this complex with the British as 'chronic Russophobia with regard to their vast apportions in the East'¹³.

¹¹ H.G. Wells. *The New World Order*, 1940.

“Political federation, we have to realise, without a concurrent economic collectivisation, is bound to fail. The task of the peace-maker who really desires peace in a new world, involves not merely a political but a profound social revolution, profounder even than the revolution attempted by the Communists in Russia. The Russian Revolution failed not by its extremism but through the impatience, violence and intolerance of its onset, through lack of foresight and intellectual insufficiency. The cosmopolitan revolution to a world collectivism, which is the only alternative to chaos and degeneration before mankind, has to go much further than the Russian...”

¹² Герберт Уэллс. Россия во мгле. – В: Собрание сочинений в 15-ти томах. Том 15. Москва, 1964, с. 99. <http://lib.ru/INOFANT/UELS/russia.txt>

¹³ H.G. Wells. *The New World Order*, 1940.

From Russian perspective, there is the mirror 'European complex', which is to be traced back in the 18th century during the Europeanization and modernization under Peter I. Europe mostly as a cultural concept. It has always been a benchmark of national identification for the Russian social thinkers, whether positive (Western-oriented Liberals) or negative (Slavophiles, Pochveniks-Conservatives and Western-oriented Socialists). This specific intellectual schizophrenia of the 'Eastern' and the 'European' in the Russian national self-awareness among the intellectuals has persisted in modern Russia as well.

Russia's Eurasian geopolitical identification is also related to the reaction of the neo-liberal wave of depersonalization of nations and the traditional family as a norm of conduct. The East, as an important component of Russia and a conservative guardian of the patriarchal society, even after its modernization by the Soviet authority in the style of the *White Sun of the Desert*, can in no way accept this neoliberal attempt for destruction of the national identity and its transformation into a corporate one, nor the depersonalization of the traditional family in an automated society of elves, Conchitas and other images, close not only to the show business in Eurasia but not to the public norms. Conservatism, however, is not an ideology either of Russia or of any of the EU member states, i.e. this is the other major difference with the USSR as there is no ideological doctrine.

The Eurasian project of the geopolitical identity is also a reaction to the mild de-Christianization of the European Union. Europe is a Christian civilization and culture but the European Union denied to make this fundamental principle formal but rather began a mild policy of gradual marginalization of the Christian values through the neo-liberal model multiculturalism, giving up the Christian model of multiculturalism. Europe's de-Christianization will inevitably lead to de-Europeanization of the Old Continent because the European high culture is a symbiosis of Antiquity and Christianity (the topics in painting, music, architecture, etc.) unless this tendency is changed. The Eurasian project is also a reaction to the de-Christianization in the Middle East (in a hard and, unfortunately, irreversible version through the physical destruction of ancient Christian cultures).

The Eurasian project is a reaction to the Salafi Islam, particularly regarding the current quasi-terrorist Islamic State. It is a part of the strategy of discrediting the Islam as a traditional religion, its politicization and depersonalization (within a few month in 2014, the international Islamic formation destroyed Sufi cemeteries, mosques (not only Shia but Sunni as well) and everything, related to the Arab culture. The only thing they accept is the black flag. Any other trace of civilization is subject to destruction in their formal ideology and a policy of genocide against Yazidis, Assyrians and other ancient nationalities on these lands.

The danger from this tendency affects mostly Russia and Kazakhstan. The Tatarstan youth in Russia are an object to Salafi interest. In the recent years there have been targeted murders of moderate Imams and their replacement with radical ones. The local youth receive their training in Cairo and other religious centres, from which they return having acquired a specific idea about Islam, which is quite remote from its moderate version in Tatarstan; Russia will only now try to set up its own educational Islamic centres in order to stop this wave of neophytes with unpredictable political actions but this would take time. Kazakhstan, on its part, is jeopardized by the Islamism of its southern neighbour, Uzbekistan.

It is interesting to see the place of Soviet identity in post-Soviet Eurasia. In Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, there are three different views of the Soviet history in terms of post-Soviet identity. Russia, on the one hand, has kept the melody of the Soviet anthem of 1943 because this is the music of victory, 9 May, a sacral holiday for all Russians and Rossiyans, irrespective of their national identity, social differences, from the whole political spectrum. On the other hand, however, Russia is afraid of the Soviet past outside the Great Patriotic War and does not observe 7 November any longer. It was unsuccessfully replaced with 4 November (which, although meant as a Day of Unity, has acquired the opposite connotation due to the Russian marches). This escape from 7 November is pointless (even in the new concept of the textbook of Russian history the term 'Great October Revolution' and the preceding 'February Revolution' are removed and summarized as 'Great Russiyan Revolution').

The date, 7 November, marks the birth of a new community, which – after 9 May 1945 - evolved into a Soviet nation with the awareness of a winner-nation. The Soviet Union has an attractive image for the Western society due to its active and intelligent propaganda. In many respects, due to the existence of USSR, Western Europe has gradually introduced a social policy and the idea about a social state. The purpose was not to imitate USSR but to make sure that the European society would not wish to have its own Soviet Union. This has brought more humanity into Europe and it was not a mere chance that after the end of the Cold War the Western European citizens began abandoning the social idea. Yet, the denial of 7 November in post-Soviet Russia is the serial example of a Chaadayev-styled attitude towards one's own history – excessively critical self-denial to the extreme.

Belarus, on its part, accepts the whole Soviet heritage: it not only sacralizes WWII but also observes the Day of the October Revolution. Besides, the day of the liberation of Minsk from the Nazis (3 July) is a national holiday. The Eurasian Union can guarantee the sovereignty of Belarus and the other member states if it begins functioning in accordance with its original design: as an economic and pragmatic union of equals and not as a neo-Soviet project, as demonically presented by the Western analysts, threatened by its competition. The lack of own

gas transmission system on the territory of Belarus and its circumventing by North Stream serve to a certain extent as a guarantee for this country's sovereignty.

One of the reasons for the external provoking of the Ukrainian crisis is namely the gas connection between Russia and Europe and the US struggle to replace Russia from the European market and its remodeling after the US one through the signing of the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement. USA also wants to make the EU dependent on shale gas, deposits of which are to be found in Southeastern Ukraine as well.

Geopolitically, economically and culturally, the European Union is close to the Eurasian one, but we are about to see whether Europe will run from Lisbon to Vladivostok in line with the Russian strategy, covering also Belarus, being an European country with Slav-Baltic culture, complementing the Russian one, which can serve as a bridge between Russia and Europe thus taking the role, which Ukraine failed to play.

Kazakhstan is most moderate regarding its Soviet past: there is no sacralization of USSR, as in Belarus. However, it marks 9 May and, at the same time, maintains the historical memory about the camps with magnificent museums. It does not follow the example of Ukraine, which has focused on the complex of the victim, presenting the Holodomor [hunger extermination] as a national genocide but instead shows it as perennial policy for all Soviet peoples covered by the collectivization. Kazakhstan does not forget 16 December 1986, when the special unit, along with Interior Ministry troops, acting on order by Mikhail Gorbachev, busted severely a rally of the Kazakh intellectuals in Almati, which protested the appointment by Kremlin of an outsider (Gennady Kolbin) for First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Republic. It is not accidental that 16 December has been chosen as Independence Day in Kazakhstan. In the meantime, Nazarbayev perceives USSR as 'our former common country'¹⁴.

The fact that all three regimes – of Lukashenka, Putin and Nazarbayev – are authoritarian in a specific sphere allows to compensate for the 'tough historical deadlines' with operational fastness of decision-making, which is unattainable for the parliamentary democracies, requiring procedural time. The problem with the authoritarian regime is the choice of a successor of power, which creates interregnum contributing to the political crisis but this specific situation is inevitable and surmountable.

¹⁴ "Мы же, республики бывшего Союза, историей и судьбой подготовлены к единому сообществу. Нам присущи одни формы и механизмы связей и управления, общий менталитет, многое другое". – Выступление Нурсултана Назарбаева в МГУ им. М.В. Ломоносова. 1994. http://yeurasia.org/nazarbaev_msu_1994/

The linguistic dualism in Belarus and Kazakhstan having preserved the status of the Russian language equalizing it with their national languages predetermines the fact that the Russian should be main communication language of the future Eurasia – lingua franca.

Where is the East in Russia's post-Soviet identity?

The East is geopolitically identical with Russia, which is Eurasian, as its project of regional integration and even globalization for a part of the post-Soviet area (mostly the Eastern one). On the other hand, Russia's geopolitical vector is oriented towards the West having as its ultimate goal the Big Europe – from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The same area could also be called 'Big Eurasia' but it has been preserved as 'Big Europe' in the post-Soviet geopolitical lexis because the Russian cultural identity is European. In this context, the concept of 'European identity' is important because since 1991 there has been a trend of suggesting that the 'Eastern European identity' is second-rate compared to the 'Central European' or the 'Western European' ones.

The concept of 'Eastern Europe' is only geopolitical and is related to the Soviet sphere of influence in the Eastern Bloc in the period from WWII to 1991. The concept of 'Central Europe' is not less political. It is often relayed in order to isolate the Belarusians and the Ukrainians from the 'East' (or Russia). However, for the time being, it remains artificial with the former and painful with the latter. The culture is either European or not and any other addition – Western, Eastern, Central, etc. – is geopolitical. For Russia, the East has been present in the Russian culture only after its Europeanization (in this respect, the East is an endless source of enrichment of the Russia and, through it, of the European culture).

East is a conservative component of the Russian national identity, which is religious (Eastern Orthodox spirituality in harmonic co-habitation with all traditional religions in Russia) and which is traditional (as a model of the family) and even largely patriarchal as a behaviour.

The East is within the Eurasian statehood of Russia (strong centralization, which is inevitable due to the huge territory) and, therefore, the political system involves educational authoritarianism combined with Eurasian democracy and oligarchic capitalism; the sacralization of the state is an important part of the Russian identity. The state should invoke pride – otherwise the Russians could themselves destroy it. The Russian history of the 19th and the 20th centuries has shown that noone could conquer or destroy Russia from the outside (1812, 1941–1945) but Russia can destroy itself, if it wishes (1917, 1991). It should not be forgotten, however, that, while Russia has not been defeated by the West, the East has destroyed it once (Ancient Rus by the Tatar-Mongols).

Paradoxically, Europe of the time of the Enlightenment is more likely to be preserved by Russia and Belarus through the Eurasian Union than by Brussels, for the time being oriented towards open de-Christianization and de-Europeanization of the Old Continent under the pressure of trans-national corporations. The latter seek not only destroying the states – the elimination of state control - but also turning the nations into atomized planctoon of elfs of a third gender. The Russian culture is European and, along with the Belarusian and Ukrainian (Malorussian), may prevent the danger of having one day only the name left out of Europe, like Atlantida.

Only a balance between the East and the West in post-Soviet Russia may prevent the consecutive autoimmune crisis due to lack of national identity though a policy of dualism (Russian-Russiyan), having combined the imperial and the national – the two faces of the Russian post-Soviet eagle, of *the phoenix-empire*.