Bulgarian 1980s – the Decade of ommited chances of Reforms. Iskra Baeva

BULGARIAN 1980s – THE DECADE OF OMMITED CHANCES OF REFORMS

Prof. Iskra Baeva

The transition to parliamentary democracy and the market economy in Eastern Europe has been accomplished during the last decade of the 20^th century. But the speed of this process, as well as its success or failure, was predetermined to a large extent by the previous decade, that started with the Polish crises in the summer of 1980 and ended with the fall of Berlin wall in the autumn of 1989. Each of the East European countries responded in its own to the crisis of the ‘East European socialism’, that became evident in the very beginning of the 1980s, and to the attempts the last Soviet leader Mihail Gorbachev started in order to transform the system. Nowadays historians are fully aware of the significant differences between the countries of the Eastern Bloc that looked so monolithic. These differences were, in the first place, in the attitude to the Soviet ‘perestroyka’. Hungary and Poland, which were quite in advance with the reforms, welcomed and encouraged it, while conservative Rumania and Eastern Germany tried to prevent the spread of its influence.

Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, who in the middle of the 1980s had been governing the country for nearly thirty years, is usually attached to the conservative leaders and to Gorbachev’s rivals. In the course of his long rule, Zhivkov had succeeded in creating an image of Bulgaria as the most faithful ally of the Soviet Union. In the beginning of 1960s Zhivkov even wrote a letter to Khrushchev, announcing that Bulgaria may become a part of the USSR, though it would be realized in the remote future[i]. All this explains why Gorbachev’s radical changes in the USSR led Zhivkov to the situation, in which he had to choose between his own pro-Soviet orientation and his personal salvation. This was a dramatic choice not only for Zhivkov himself, but also for Bulgaria, and the newly declassified archive records reveal that it was not entirely conservative-orientated.

I’m going to draw your attention to Zhivkov’s activities during the last decade of the existence of the Soviet type state socialism. They give me the possibility to explain my opinion that the view of the 1980s as a ‘black decade’ is too general and not very precise. This was the decade, when in most countries of the Eastern Bloc, political regimes were going on the direction of softening, at least because after the Final Act of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe had been signed on August 1st, 1975 in Helsinki, East European societies were forced to accept influence and control from the outside. From economic point of view, the differences between East European states grew deeper, but as far as Bulgaria is concerned, there continued the process of opening its economy to the world and the efforts were made for new technologies to develop, especially in the sphere of electronics[ii]. Like the rest of the states from the Soviet sphere, Bulgaria organized large-scale celebrations of the one thousand and the three hundred years’ anniversary of the establishment of the Bulgarian State. Zhivkov’s daughter - Liudmila Zhivkova, had done preparation work. She took profit from his father’s unrestricted power to carry out deep reforms in cultural life, changing the strict party and ideological control on the intellectuals with free contacts with the West and with free search for new styles and creative manners[iii]. Thus, the 1980s in Bulgaria started not so much with the sense of a deepening crisis, but more or less with the hope that the future to come would bring more freedom and richness.

It is difficult to view the 1980s as one whole period, because they brought events, which appeared to be turning points to international relations and in the inner political and economic processes. It would be enough to point out the evolution in American-Soviet relations, starting with Reagan, who called the Soviet Union ‘The Empire of evil’ and ending with his personal, almost friendly meetings with Mihail Gorbachev. Still, I would rather stick to Bulgarian events. Bulgarian 1980s were not one whole entity and it is difficult to regard it from such point of view, as for Bulgaria it had three different stages. The first half – after the celebration in 1981 till Gorbachev’s rise in March 1985 – was unexpectedly difficult. The troubles began with the so-called ‘Bulgarian trace’ in the attempt on the Pope’s life in May 1981, which had been fabricated in 1982[iv]. After that have came the growing accusations that Bulgaria was taken part in weapon and drug traffic and was in contact with states, already accused in international terrorism. These accusations were not a surprise, as they were part of the so-called ‘second Cold war’ and proved how close Bulgaria was to the Soviet Union[v]. But they brought about the economic difficulties of the state at the moment, when Bulgaria had just started to get out of its excessive dependence on COMECON and had been trying to find its place in the world market relations[vi].

This is the right moment to pay attention to the financial problems, which influenced the events of the 1980s. At the end of the 1970s Bulgaria, just like the other Eastern Bloc states, found itself in the so-called ‘debt trap’ towards the West. The relatively high rate of economic development during the 1970s, the hopes that new technologies would cause the acceleration of development, as well as the pure political plans, that people would rush to the consumption of material wealth and would not be interested of politics, persuaded Bulgarian leaders to borrow from the generous Western financial institutions. But after the October War of 1973 the world economy went down and the hopes, that debts would be paid quickly, were crushed. In 1979 Bulgaria, with its nine million population, had already a debt of a 4.4 billions dollars. It looked frightening to Zhivkov and immediately after 1981 celebrations he took measures to do with the debt. Bulgarian ‘tightening the belts’ can hardly be compared to the Rumanian one, but the Bulgarians still remember painfully that the then imposed regime in electricity consumption. Nevertheless, it was by 1985, that Bulgaria succeeded to get out of that ‘debt trap’, decreasing the debt to the bearable sum of seven hundred million dollars[vii]. Thus, the Bulgarians lived their ‘black (for the consumer’ point of view) years’ up to 1985 and these did not come back until the beginning of the 1890s.

But if we take a look at the international image of the state, we shall see a rather different situation. From the beginning of the 1980s Bulgaria had already shattered positions in international relations, but they became even worse, after the large-scale action, undertaken in the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985. Then eight hundred thousand Bulgarian Turks had been forced to change their Turkish names with the Bulgarian ones. That led to very negative reactions abroad. Up to now there can be found no reasonable explanation for the decision of Communist Party leadership to start the so-called ‘revival process’ at that precise moment[viii]. It is clear, that it was part of the attempts at putting an accent on nationalist characteristics of the regime, which had been looking for a new legitimacy. But it is difficult to believe, that it had be undertaken without coordination with the Soviet leadership, and at that time in Kremlin governed Konstantin Chernenko, who had been very ill. In March 1985 he died and Gorbachev took the power. Zhivkov cherished hopes that the new Soviet leader would support the ‘revival process’, but Gorbachev quickly took distance in regard to this flagrant violation of human rights in Bulgaria. At that time it was already impossible to neglect the question of human rights, as it had become part of the Helsinki process in the whole of Europe[ix].

Bulgaria associated the beginning of the second half of the 1980s with Gorbachev’s coming to power. Till the summer of 1987 Zhivkov was trying to conform his own policy with that of the Soviet leader, as he had successfully done with all previous Kremlin masters – Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. Zhivkov demonstrated loyalty and desire for close cooperation first in March 1985, and once again in October 1985, when he met Gorbachev personally. Gorbachev’s intentions to reorganize the relations within COMECON and to build them on the basis of economic efficiency, thus putting an end to the one-sided Soviet help did not suit Bulgarian interest. Still, this was not the basic reason for the rising conflict between the two leaders[x].

Being a new and relatively young leader, Mihail Gorbachev was ready to undertake deep reforms, and the economic situation in the USSR imposed them imperatively. Gorbachev and his team were also aware, that these reforms had to be carried out by new politicians, unencumbered, if possible, with the past. Gorbachev himself belonged to the new generation of politicians. With the exception of Wojciech Jaruzelski, all the rest of the East European leaders belonged to the old generation – twenty years older and attached to the status quo to such an extend, that they would hardly desire its total change. This helps to explain Gorbachev’s natural urge to start the reforms first changing the personnel and in the USSR that was done during the first several months of the ‘perestroyka’. But in the satellite states such change could not be carried out so easily, especially having in mind Gorbachev’s declaration, that the Soviet Union would no longer interfere with the inner affairs of its allies. Of course, these were just words and not serious intentions, but still there is no doubt, that the mechanism of the Soviet influence started to change. It became not so evident, and was more indirect, profiting from the inner contradictions in the leadership of the Communist Parties, and relying on the younger forces with modern thinking against the conservative ones. In Bulgaria Soviet support went to the group of younger politicians, who had studied in Soviet high schools. They had positions in government and in Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee. Formally Petar Mladenov, the foreign minister, stood ahead of this group, but Andrey Lukanov coordinated its activity[xi].

Thus, the changes in the situation inside and outside the country made it quite natural for Zhivkov to join the group of those, who rejected Gorbachev’s ‘perestroyka’ and among them in the first place Nikolae Ceausescu and Walter Ulbricht. Bulgarian leader, however, was not a conservative in the strict sense of the word. Up to that moment he succeeded to maintain his place in power by means of changes. Those in economic policy were really important – for instance, technocrats took the place of party secretaries. Beside, the painful experience of the first half of the 1980s persuaded Zhivkov, that economic system needed deep changes and this conviction grew stronger, when he visited Japan[xii]. That is why Zhivkov welcomed Gorbachev’s intention to carry out reforms and even tried to help him with advises on economic themes[xiii]. But Zhivkov feared the political reforms in the USSR and especially Gorbachev’s personal attitude towards him, which was obviously rather distant. Zhivkov has always been very good in winning political battles and in finding ways to preserve his own power and this can explain his long political career. Even during the years that followed his overthrow, Zhivkov preserved his political qualities, when he had no longer an unlimited political power. When he died in 1998, most of the people demonstrated their respect to him and it was not only a result of nostalgic feelings, but was also due to the comparison between him and the new politicians.

The period between the years 1985 and 1987 was the tome of awaiting, moderate economic reforms and overcoming the shock, caused to the Turks, but also to Bulgarians, by the so-called ‘revival process’. The intelligentsia desired quick changes and there appeared again a common belief in policy. Thus the soil had been prepared for the birth of Bulgarian dissident movement, but still there was any organized social resistance to the regime. The rumors then and the archive documents now reveal that there was only hidden struggle on the high levels of party hierarchy.

In Bulgaria the real reform time came with the decision, taken by the July Plenum of Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee in 1987. Zhivkov’s team worked out and imposed the so-called July Conception for total reorganization of socialism[xiv]. There were different reasons for this Conception. In the first place these were the difficulties in Bulgarian-Soviet relations. Thus, Bulgarian Conception had been inspired by the Soviet ‘perestroyka’, but it revealed Zhivkov’s intention to go even further. Soviet attempts aimed at partial use of market mechanisms and decentralization, while July Conception envisaged change in the form of ownership. Ss a first step, state ownership would be replaced by collective (that is, the workers in a state enterprise would become its collective owners), and later on – by private ownership in the form of joint-stock companies[xv]. Market principles would be introduced not only in economy, but also in spheres like social security and public health services, which till then were priority of the socialist social state. In 1989 the necessary reforms in those two spheres had been already worked out in the form of laws[xvi], but because of 10^th November political change, these laws never came into force. If we try to estimate July Conception objectively and free from propaganda influence, we have to admit, that it was an attempt at early, politically motivated and controlled transition to capitalism.

July Conception envisaged also a political reform. In spite of democratic phraseology in describing political changes, they were directed to certain liberalization, but never questioned the leading role of the Communist Party in society. Building up a civil society was proclaimed, but it had to be accomplished by the old and subordinate to the Communist Party organizations like The People’s Front, The Youth Communist Union, the official Trade-unions, Women Organization and so on. What was more, when the first dissident organizations appeared in the beginning of 1988, trying to make use of July Conception, they were suffocated by state repressive mechanisms and in that way Communist Party showed clearly that it would not give up its monopoly on power[xvii]. Nowadays in July Conception we can find out traces of Chinese reform model and this is what some of left-orientated representatives of social sciences in Bulgaria do. But I would say that it was Zhivkov’s pragmatic way of dealing with economic and political problems, which Bulgaria faced, in late 1980s.

On the one hand, from the 1970s onwards Zhivkov had always considered economic problems pragmatically and not ideologically. In his memoirs (and of those of his proteges[xviii]), one can clearly see that for him socialism was not a question of ideology, but of geo-political realities, which Bulgaria had to conform with. This explains why Zhivkov was ready to support any reform that would bring economic efficiency neglecting its ideological shell. On the other hand, Zhivkov knew so well the mechanisms of political power in the system of state socialism, that he would not underestimate the sequences of democratization, and especially its immanent part – political pluralism. Thus, when the time for radical reforms came (because otherwise Gorbachev would declare him a conservative leader), Zhivkov was ready to offer a change of economic system, but to allow only very modest political reforms.

During the third phase of the 1980s – from July Conception till Zhivkov’s overthrow on 10^th of November 1989, the Bulgarians lived in time of changes, which led to significant increase of their income and more freedom of self-expression as a result of the Soviet ‘glasnost’. The first dissident organizations appeared – they were persecuted, but the alternative views of their members spread quickly and were supported by large part of society. The third period seemed to justify people’s anticipations from the beginning of the 1980s about freedom and material progress. We may call the last two years of state socialism, together with the first months after Zhivkov’s fall, the most euphoric ones from the middle of the 20^th century until now.

But what really mattered, were not the subjective feelings of Bulgarian people, but the question whether the reforms, envisaged in July Conception, could be realized. If the answer was positive, then this Conception could have saved Bulgaria time and many efforts, and also the high social price, which the Bulgarians have to pay during the transition years from state socialism to political pluralism and market economy, which turned out to be a return back to capitalism. However my answer to this question is negative.

No matter whether Zhivkov launched July Conception with the only idea to get ahead of the Soviet ‘perestroyka’, or he really meant to change economic system, it was impossible to carry its principles into life, while Zhivkov governed the state. We have to take into consideration the situation inside the country and also the correlation of political forces. As a result of the so-called ‘revival process’ Zhivkov’s regime lost prestige not only in the West, but also in the Third World and especially in Arab countries. Besides, Zhivkov lost Soviet support, on which he had been relying for several decades. As a politician Zhivkov was clever enough to understand, that in relatively small Bulgaria he would not be able to carry out deep reforms without outside support. And this was the reason for Zhivkov’s attempts to impress Gorbachev with reforms and with constant declarations of loyalty to the Soviet Union, that went on till the end of Zhivkov’s rule, in spite the obvious strain in their relations. These attempts were doomed to the failure – Gorbachev had already chosen the new ruling team in Bulgaria and the Soviet agents and structures in the country helped its activities against Zhivkov[xix].

So far as the situation in Bulgaria is concerned in regard to the necessary reforms, it should be considered from political, economic and social point of view. From political point, Zhivkov had the support only of his loyal party comrades, but they were not right persons to carry out the reforms. Those, who had modern thinking, believed that reforms had to be carried out by new people, and they supported the opposition group inside the party.

In the sphere of economy the reform-minded minority consisted of the narrow layer of West-orientated technocrats, while the great number of economist desired only an improvement of socialist system, similar to the reforms, started in the 1960s.

The social climate in Bulgaria was also unfavorable to July Conception. Th Bulgarians had long ago lost their belief in the endless changes and reforms – just the opposite, they were even convinced, that these changes had been undertaking with the only desire of the ruling party to preserve the old system. Todor Zhivkov, and those around him, had totally lost credit in society and that was why his overthrow on 10^th of November 1989 was met by the members of the Communist Party, as well as by dissidents, with joy and relief.

To conclude, the 1980s in Bulgaria were not ‘the black decade’ as far as social expectations and real changes in material conditions of life were concerned. From purely material point of view the definition ‘black decade’ suits much better to the 1990s. During the 1980s Bulgaria became a part of the common process of looking for different ways to reform state socialism and theoretically the July Conception went even further then the Soviet ‘perestroyka’. But these reforms were not implemented, and they could not have been, in the circumstances, existing in Bulgaria. Thus, the last Bulgarian attempt during the 20^th century at accelerated modernization turned out a failure.